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This article examines the relative prevalence of markets, hierarchies and 
networks in the governance of real-estate transactions under three property 
rights regimes in Windhoek’s low-income settlements. These governance 
structures are related to respective property rights regimes and to conjectures 
made about the implications for capital accumulation for the urban poor. It 
is found that network governance structures are the predominant modes of 
organising transactions under conditions of informal property rights, while 
hierarchical mechanisms predominate in the freehold and group categories. 
It is found that there is very little secondary market activity in all three rights 
categories. The article posits that, while networks provide access to real estate 
for the poor under conditions of informal rights, these are associated with 
tenure insecurity, and lock households in clusters based on ethnicity and kinship. 
Hierarchical structures, on the other hand, make freehold ownerships possible 
for the poor, but suffer from insufficient scale and create market distortions. 
It is concluded that a lack of secondary market activity in all the three rights 
categories severely limits the potential for capital accumulation.
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Abstrak
Hierdie artikel ondersoek die relatiewe voorkoms van markte, hiërargieë 
en netwerke in die (staats)bestuur van eiendomstransaksies in drie 
eiendomsregstelsels in die lae-inkomste nedersettings in Windhoek. Hierdie 
bestuurstrukture is verwant aan die onderskeie eiendomsregstrukture, en 
daar word bespiegel oor die implikasies vir die opbou van rykdom deur arm 
stedelinge. Daar word bevind dat bestuurstrukture in die vorm van netwerke 
die oorheersende wyse is waarop informele transaksies ge-organiseer word, 
terwyl hiërargiese meganismes grootliks in die vrypag- en groepskategorieë 
voorkom. Daar is ook bevind dat baie min sekondêre markaktiwiteit in enige 
van die drie kategorieë plaasvind. Die artikel betoog dat alhoewel netwerke 
toegang tot informele eiendomsreg aan armes verleen, dit gepaardgaan 
met onsekerheid oor verblyf en die verbintenis van huishoudings tot groepe 
gebaseer op verwantskap en etnisiteit. Hiërargiese strukture, daarenteen, 
maak vrypageienaarskap moontlik vir arm persone. Hierdie struktuur vind 
egter op ‘n beperkte skaal plaas en veroorsaak ook distorsies in die mark. Die 
gevolgtrekking word gemaak dat ‘n gebrek aan sekondêre markaktiwiteit 
in al drie die kategorieë van regte die potensiaal vir die opbou van kapitaal 
baie beperk.
Sleutelwoorde: Eiendomsregte, eiendomstransaksies, bestuurstrukture, Windhoek
1. Introduction
The 2015 target date for halving poverty under the Millennium 
Development Goals has provided fresh impetus for innovative 
ways in which to address urban poverty. One such approach, the 
‘making markets work for the poor’ (‘MMWP’), has in recent times, 
at least until the 2008 financial crisis, been dominant in the global 
anti-poverty discourse. This approach to fighting poverty seeks 
to leverage the power of various markets such as land markets, 
labour markets, commodity markets, financial markets, and so on 
to meet the needs of the poor. The underlying theory is that well-
functioning markets that support competition and lower the cost of 
doing business provide incentives for trade and investment, thereby 
promoting growth and poverty reduction (DfID, 2005). In the context 
of urban land, the approach does dovetail with a central tenet of 
property rights theory, which holds that secure property rights in 
real estate makes commerce between strangers easier, expanding 
opportunities and thereby increasing gains from trade.
For reason of brevity, the article does not repeat the extensive 
literature linking real estate, property rights and poverty alleviation. 
Readers are referred to comprehensive reviews in the following 
articles: Mooya (2011: 238-244) and Mooya & Cloete (2010: 436-445) 
and papers: Durand-Lasserve & Selod (2007) and Payne, Durand-
Lasserve & Rakodi (2007). A survey of this literature reveals that the 
application of the ‘MMWP’ approach to urban real-estate markets 
has not been well studied. In particular, the discussion about how 
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markets in urban real-estate markets may be made to work for the 
poor has not been framed in terms of what alternatives to the market 
mechanism exist, and how these compare as poverty alleviation 
instruments. Markets are, of course, one of the alternatives whereby 
transactions in real property may be organised. In addition, while 
there is considerable literature on the effects of property rights on 
demand for credit and investment, there has not been as much 
discussion about how different property rights regimes affect 
land transactions.
This article aims to address this lacuna in the literature, and has two 
principal objectives. First, the article reviews conventional theory 
relating to the governance of transactions, with a view of locating 
markets in their appropriate comparative context. Discussions about 
markets are rarely framed in terms of what alternatives to markets 
exist, and how these alternatives compare. Secondly, partial 
empirical results of case study research exploring the relationship 
between property rights and real-estate transactions in Windhoek’s 
urban informal settlements are presented. The article examines 
the relative prevalence of alternative ‘governance structures’ 
for transactions in real estate, namely markets, networks and 
hierarchies. The article aims to relate these governance structures to 
one of three property rights regimes of varying quality (see section 
on Methodology), and to make deductions about the implications 
for capital accumulation for the urban poor. It is argued that 
systems of property rights embed transactions in specific institutional 
environments (Menard, 2005: 218-318), giving them epistemological 
precedence over markets, hierarchies and networks. That is to say, 
systems of property rights determine whether markets, networks or 
hierarchies will be the predominant mode for organising transactions 
in specific settings.
In the context of real-estate transactions in urban informal 
settlements, this article addresses two research questions: First, 
given specific types of property rights, what ‘governance structures’ 
are adopted or observed? Secondly, what consequences arise, 
deductively, for the poor from organising transactions in that 
fashion? The article employs the conceptual framework developed 
by Mooya & Cloete (2007: 147-165). This conceptual framework 
brings together institutional arrangements, property rights and 
transaction costs as determinants of real-estate market liquidity. 
Market liquidity is argued as being important in the realisation of the 
latent value of real estate which, in turn, helps in the accumulation 
of capital for the poor.
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2. Conceptual framework and literature review
As with other economic goods, transactions in real estate involve 
at least six basic activities, namely search, inspection, contracting, 
execution, control, and enforcement (Furubotn & Richter, 1998). 
There are various ways of organising these transactions. Thus 
real-estate transactions may be ‘administered’, ‘organised’, or 
‘governed’ by alternative structures. 
The conventional approach is to view governance structures in 
terms of two extremes, with transactions organised within markets, 
at one end, and with transactions organised within hierarchical 
organisations, at the other (Furubotn & Richter, 1998). In between 
are a variety of hybrid forms, of which network structures are the 
most salient.
In this article, markets are narrowly defined to mean a mode of 
organising voluntary arm’s-length exchanges between independent 
actors. ‘Spot markets’ are archetypical of this definition (Menard, 
2005: 218-318). The defining characteristic of such markets is the pre-
eminent role played by ‘prices’ in the allocation of resources. From 
a purely efficiency point of view, markets are generally perceived to 
be superior to other modes of resource allocation.
In contrast to the role of prices in markets, hierarchical governance 
structures emphasise the exercise of ‘command’ in resource 
allocation. This implies the existence of decision-makers with the 
necessary authority to impose their will or give effect to their wishes. 
Networks forms of organisation, for their part, rely on neither prices 
nor command as principal modes for coordination. 
Rather, transactions are structured by ‘relationships’ between agents 
based on notions of solidarity, altruism, loyalty, reciprocity and trust 
(Thompson, 2003; Meagher, 2005: 217-238). Smith-Doer & Powell 
(2005) emphasise that network governance structures are most salient 
in a domain between the flexibility of markets and the visible hand 
of organisational authority. Network governance structures provide 
scope for human agency, which may be narrow in hierarchical 
structures, while emphasising structure and constraint, which may be 
weak in ‘atomised’ markets (Smith-Doerr & Powell, 2005).
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Table 1: Types of socio-economic order
Basic attributes Market order Network order Hierarchical order

























































Source: Thompson, 2003: 48
Table 1 is a comparative summary of the characteristics of the three 
governance structures or ‘socio-economic orders’
Given that specific transactions may alternatively be coordinated 
by markets, hierarchies and networks, the problem is to determine 
which governance structure is economically preferable under 
which detailed circumstances (Menard, 2005). It is suggested, in 
this instance, that the preferable one in the context of low-income 
settlements would be the one that maximises opportunities for 
capital accumulation.
Transaction-cost theory provides an explanation for the existence 
of alternative modes of organisation as well as the characteristics 
of these arrangements (Menard, 2005). Transaction costs are 
postulated to arise, due to both the complexity of the decision 
environment and the propensity on the part of human beings for 
opportunism, described in memorable fashion by Oliver Williamson 
(1985: 30) as ‘self-interest seeking with guile’. It is postulated that 
calculative agents will adopt the mode of organisation that 
economises on transaction costs, while safeguarding transactions 
against opportunism (Menard, 2005: 218-318).
Markets are conventionally viewed as the default governance 
structure (‘… in the beginning there were markets’, Thompson, 
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2003: 67, citing Williamson, 1985). This is perhaps mainly due to their 
superior efficiency in solving the coordination problem via the price 
mechanism. In addition, compared to hierarchical organisations, 
markets appear on the surface to function with relative ease, 
requiring very little by way of visible supporting infrastructure and 
allowing for buyers and sellers to consummate transactions quickly, 
democratically and in an egalitarian fashion. For this reason, the 
existence of alternative governance structures has been explained 
in terms of market failure arising from high transaction costs. The 
existence of hierarchy, for instance, has been explained in term of 
this logic. As Menard (2005: 218-318) puts it, when the cost of using 
the price system becomes too high, the organisation of activities 
under a central command may become advantageous.
Eggertsson (1990: 15) lists the costs associated with using the price 
system and arising in the course of the six types of transactions 
identified above as follows:
• The search for information about the distribution of prices and 
quality of commodities, the search for potential buyers and 
sellers and for relevant information about their behaviour and 
circumstances.
• The bargaining that is needed to find the true position of 
buyers and sellers.
• The making of contracts.
• The monitoring of contractual partners to establish whether 
they abide by the terms of the contract.
• The enforcement of a contract and the collection of damages 
when partners fail to observe their contractual obligations.
• The protection of property rights against third-party 
encroachment.
Hierarchical structures may, in certain circumstances, be better 
placed to mediate these costs. For example, they may take 
advantages of economies of scale in information-gathering and 
-processing as well as access to financial resources and technical 
expertise to reduce search and information costs, and bargaining 
and decision costs. In addition, as Menard (2005: 218-318) argues, 
the capacity of decision-makers in hierarchical organisations 
to allocate resources without negotiation reduces bargaining 
and decision costs and provides a powerful tool for dealing with 
uncertainty. Finally, hierarchical organisations tend to be vested 
with administrative and/or statutory authority, backed with both 
internal and enforcement capability of the state, thus giving them 
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a comparative advantage when dealing with supervision and 
enforcement costs.
The costs associated with using hierarchical structures are well 
documented in the literature. These include inflexibility and 
inefficiencies typical of bureaucratic forms of governance. Other 
costs arise from the activities of decision-makers in these organisations 
who may have incentives to pursue socially undesirable activities. 
Given the power, for instance, to administratively allocate a 
valuable commodity such as land and housing to the poor, decision-
makers may engage in corruption and other forms of ‘rent-seeking’ 
behaviour, benefiting existing elites at the expense of the poor who 
lack the wherewithal to successfully navigate officialdom.
Networks provide appropriate governance structures for those for 
whom the market system is too costly as an option and for those 
for whom official hierarchy is inaccessible or unavailable. According 
to Smith-Doerr & Powell (2005), networks provide three broad 
categories of benefits, namely access, timeliness and referrals. 
Social ties inherent in networks can facilitate access to parties that 
provide information or resources in an expeditious manner. Referrals 
by members of networks offer the opportunity to bypass formal, 
impersonal channels, again expediting access to information 
and resources (Smith-Doerr & Powell, 2005). North (1990, cited in 
Meagher 2005: 217-238) views networks as mechanisms for reducing 
transaction costs by filling gaps in formal institutional arrangements, 
particularly in contexts of underdevelopment or institutional collapse, 
such as is found in informal settlements. In these contexts, networks 
are thus appropriately conceived as providing a framework for 
‘order without law’ (Ellickson, 1991, cited in Meagher 2005) or ‘order 
for free’ (Sturgess, 1997, cited in Meagher, 2005). Perhaps more 
significantly for this article, it is argued in the literature that dense 
network ties may enhance economic efficiency, by reducing the 
cost of economic organisation.
Against these advantages are ranged a number of disadvantages. 
For instance, networks based on kinship or ethnic ties, by 
emphasising group solidarity and loyalty, may stifle innovation, 
thereby locking members in ‘low-level’ equilibrium traps. In addition, 
transactions based on altruism and reciprocity may stand in the 
way of greater economic efficiency. Network forms of co-ordination 
may, for example, lead to free-rider problems and situations where 
some individuals reap disproportional benefits or costs from the 
collaboration (Entwistle, Bristow, Hines, Donaldson & Martin, 2007: 
63-79). Meagher (2005: 217-238) refers to studies which show that 
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African social networks have not been conducive to economic 
development, allowing a redistributive logic to overwhelm efforts 
at accumulation. Meagher (2005: 217-238) goes so far as to 
associate the expansion of social networks in African societies with 
‘parochialism, criminality and communal violence’ rather than with 
economic development. Under these circumstances, network forms 
of co-ordination are a source of ‘social liability’ rather than ‘social 
capital’ (Entwistle et al., 2007: 63-79).
It is argued, in this instance, that systems of property rights determine 
or affect the governance structures adopted in practice, because 
of the intimate relationship between property rights and transaction 
costs. Transaction costs, for example, have been defined as the 
costs associated with the transfer, capture and protection of 
property rights (Barzel, 1989). The key relationships, therefore, are 
that property rights determine transaction costs which, in turn, are 
associated with respective optimal governance structures. Markets, 
hierarchies and networks for their part ultimately determine the 
extent and manner in which real estate may be used as a tool for 
capital accumulation and, therefore, poverty alleviation.
3. Methodology
3.1 Methodological approach
The results discussed in this article come from a larger case study 
which used the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework (Ostrom, 2008) as a basis for the comparative analysis 
of the effects of three types of property rights regimes in settlements 
located on Windhoek’s periphery, namely freehold rights, informal 
rights and group rights. These property rights are conceived as the 
key institutional variable differentially affecting their respective 
markets. Freehold property rights are clearly defined, in terms of 
both content and spatial extent. This means rights are held with 
regard to specific demarcated plots. In addition, holders of these 
rights can sell, lease, bequeath and exercise all the normal rights of 
property ownership. Very significantly, these rights are enforceable 
by the state. They are, therefore, very secure.
The informal market, on the other hand, is, as the name implies, 
structured by informal, often illegal property rights. By informal rights 
is meant those rights held by economic agents that fail to adhere 
to the established institutional rules or are denied their protection 
(Portes & Haller, 2005: 425). As in the formal market, property is 
acquired, sold, leased, given out, and so on, but in an atmosphere of 
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state disapproval. Lacking state sanction, the property rights in these 
markets may be weak. Indeed, residents of informal settlements may 
incur dispossession of property rights by way of forced evictions and 
relocation by the state. On the other hand, the tenuous nature of 
these rights may mean holders are susceptible to predatory activities 
of others. Hence, the conventional view that informal property rights 
are insecure and that they, therefore, inhibit investment and market 
activity. From a policy point of view, this has underpinned efforts 
aimed at providing formal freehold rights to residents of informal 
settlements. This is regarded as crucial to the leveraging of, among 
other things, real-estate markets for poverty alleviation.
Finally, in the context of this study, the group market refers to those 
markets structured by a system of group property rights. These group 
rights arise from the activities of savings associations, who pool 
savings to purchase land from the municipality. This land is surveyed 
in the conventional manner, subdivided from the surrounding 
informal settlements and registered in freehold title in the name of a 
trust or other corporate body. The key difference from conventional 
freehold rights is that the land is occupied under a system of group 
tenure. Thus anything up a 100 individuals may occupy the block of 
land, on specific plots surveyed to a lower standard. Significantly, 
holders of group rights have more restricted powers to deal with 
their property than holders of freehold rights. For example, sales 
to outsiders may not be allowed without the specific approval of 
group members.
The external boundaries and rights of group property enjoy the 
full protection of the state in terms of the formal law. In this sense, 
group rights are very secure. The internal boundaries and rights, on 
the other hand, are subject to whatever arrangements may have 
been agreed by members of respective groups. In most instances, 
these would be set out in their respective constitutions. Members do 
not own real rights over their property, i.e. they cannot for instance 
mortgage their land. Crucially, local groups, rather than the state, 
are the primary enforcement mechanism for these rights.
The case study settlements were selected on the basis that in each 
was present in close physical proximity the three types of property 
regimes. The intention was to control, up to a point, for the influence 
of physical and material conditions and attributes of community, 
thus leaving the institution of property rights as the independent or 
causal variable.
Therefore, the comparative institutional approach adopted in this 
study attempts to evaluate the effects of the three property rights 
Mooya et al • Governance structures
55
regimes on real-estate transactions. These rights systems can be 
conceived as occupying specific positions on a continuum, moving 
from completely illegal to fully formalised. A comparative assessment 
is clearly the best way of dealing with the vexed question of whether 
more formal property rights are efficacious for poverty alleviation. 
As Ostrom (2008) argues, without such systematic, comparative 
institutional assessment, recommendations on reform may be based 
on naïve ideas about which kinds of institutions are ‘good’ or ‘bad’, 
and not on the analysis of performance. This is particularly important 
in this instance where policy interventions have in the main sought 
to transform informal property rights into individual freehold rights.
3.2 Research design
The main empirical data for the study was collected from two 
settlements in the north-western and northern fringes of Windhoek, 
called Goreangab and Okahandja Park, respectively. A total of 440 
out of the intended 600 households were successfully interviewed. 
Of these, only 17 (or approximately 4%) stated that they were 
renters. This relatively low number resulted from the methodological 
approach of sampling households, and reflects the low incidence of 
outright renting of entire dwellings, as opposed to renting of rooms 
or outbuildings. The rental market, as the discussion in the findings 
section will show, is significantly higher than is suggested by the 
above statistic.
It is estimated that the sample represented approximately 10% of 
the relevant population, although this is difficult to confirm, due to 
the lack of suitably disaggregated data. The interviews themselves 
were carried out with the aid of detailed questionnaires (available 
on request from the corresponding author).
In addition to the standard interviews described above, a total of 
14 respondents were selected for detailed unstructured interviews 
in order to gain deeper insights into aspects of the market process. 
Six of these were from the informal category, with four from each of 
the group and freehold categories. To obtain a range of contextual 
information, these interviews were supplemented with semi-
structured interviews held with key officials from the Windhoek City 
Council (WCC), the Namibian Housing Action Group (NHAG), and 
the Namibian Housing Enterprises (NHE).
The Windhoek City Council is responsible for the control and 
regulation of informal settlements. In addition, most of these 
settlements are on land that legally belongs to the municipality. The 
Namibian Housing Action Group (NHAG) is the service NGO to the 
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Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia (SDFN), an alliance of savings 
groups operating in many informal settlements in Namibia, whose 
principal aim is to mobilise collective savings for the purchase and 
group settlement of land for their members. The Namibian Housing 
Enterprises (NHE) is a state entity with a virtual monopoly in the 
provision of very low-income formal housing in Namibia. The NHE 
has a wide mandate and is, therefore, a significant player in this 
area. It acts as developer, provides loans for the purchase of its own 
developments and lets out units that have not been sold. Its pre-
eminence in this market segment is such that all the formal housing 
in the Goreangab area has ultimately been developed by the NHE.
The study employed a qualitative methodology. The data was 
analysed mostly descriptively. In order to test for significance of 
any differences between the three samples and to attribute these 
differences to respective property rights categories, three types of 
statistical tests were done for a few critical variables, namely:
• One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test for the 
significance of differences for continuous variables between 
the three samples.
•	 Chi-square tests to test for significance of differences between 
categorical variables between the three samples.
• Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to control for the income 
differences between the samples.
3.3 Study area
Empirical data was collected from two low-income/informal 
settlements in the Katutura area of the Namibian capital, Windhoek, 
namely Goreangab and Okahandja Park. Goreangab, also known 
as Greenwell Matongo, is approximately 8 kilometres from the 
city centre. It is a resettlement area where single-quarter residents 
were resettled in 1992 and offered various options to buy land or 
housing property. The population of Goreangab consists of formal 
housing, resettled residents and squatters. Okahandja Park lies at 
the northern edge of Okuryangava, also approximately 8 kilometres 
from the city centre. The population in this settlement consists of 
almost exclusively resettled residents and squatters.
The broader Katutura area has expanded considerably, mainly 
as a result of immigration. Between 1970 and 1987, the Katutura 
population doubled from 25.464 to approximately 55.000. It 
almost doubled again in the five years between 1987 and 1991 
(Pendleton, 1996; Pendleton, 1991). The 2001 census data put the 
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population of Katutura at approximately 142.000 (NPC, 2005), 61% 
of Windhoek’s total. The most recent (2011) census saw Windhoek’s 
population rise to approximately 322.500 (NPC, 2012). Though this 
census data is not disaggregated to indicate the population of 
Katutura per se, the evidence reaffirms the primacy of Katutura in 
Windhoek’s demographics.
Poverty levels in Katutura are high, mainly as a result of high 
unemployment, low literacy and education, large numbers of 
pre-school age children, and recent migration to the urban area 
(Pendleton, n.d.). Those in formal employment are usually unskilled 
workers, with a sizable number working for the Government or 
parastatals. Others work as domestics in the more affluent parts of 
Windhoek. The lack of sufficient employment opportunities in the 
formal sector has resulted in most people resorting to informal means 
of income generation. Peyroux & Graefe (1995) report that 73% of 
heads of households in this area were engaged in informal activities, 
often carried out in the place of residence. According to Frayne 
(1992), the following are the main economic activities in Katutura:
• Street trading.
• Backyard mechanics and metalworking.
• Taxi enterprises.
• ‘Shebeens’ (illegal bars) and cuca (grocery) shops at private 
houses.
• Other home-based activities such as tailoring and child-
minding, and so on.
Though relatively small in absolute numbers, and when compared 
to say that of South Africa, the size of Namibia’s informal population 
has posed enormous challenges to the authorities. The municipality’s 
response to the problem of informal settlements is encapsulated in 
the Development and Upgrading Strategy (DUS) adopted in 1999. 
In terms of implementation, the DUS has four strategic thrusts: The 
in-situ upgrading of informal settlements; the development of areas 
for resettlement; ‘Greenfield’ development, and the promotion of 
self-help group development (City of Windhoek, 2005). Of these, 
upgrading and self-help group development have been the 
preferred options.
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4. Analysis and discussion
Table 2:  Numbers of households interviewed, by property rights 
type and settlement
Name of settlement



































Source: Authors’ survey data
Table 2 shows the overall characteristics of the survey sample, 
whereas Tables 3 and 4 show the characteristics of the respondents 
in terms of employment status and average income, respectively. 
The highest levels of unemployment, at 27.4%, are to be found in the 
informal category, followed by the group category (19.8%) and the 
freehold category (2.9%). In addition, respondents in the freehold 
category have qualitatively better jobs, with nearly 46% holding 
‘white collar’ jobs.
Table 3:  Employment status
Type of employment



























































Source: Authors’ survey data
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The nature of employment is varied. Those in self-employment are 
likely to be engaged in activities such as selling kapana (i.e. cooked 
meat), running cuca (i.e. grocery) shops or shebeens (i.e. informal, 
usually illegal bars), backyard vehicle repairs, and so on. ‘Blue 
collar’ workers are mostly domestic servants and unskilled or semi-
skilled labour working in nearby industries. Low-level civil servants, 
nurses, policemen and soldiers and others fill the ranks of ‘white 
collar’ workers. 





Maximum Minimum Range Median Number of 
observations
Informal 958.85 866.13 4200.00 0 4200 725.00 156
Group 1210.68 1771.41 12000.00 0 12000 800.00 162
Freehold 2285.05 1128.23 6100.00 200 5900 2100 99
























Current effect: F(2, 414)=31.450, p=<0.01 Kruskal-Wallis p<0.01
Effective hypothesis decomposition
Vertical bars denote 0.95 confidence intervals
Type
Low income formal
Figure 1: Test for significance of differences in mean monthly income
Though the data shows that those in the informal category have the 
lowest average income, the differences between this and the group 
category is not statistically significant (see Figure 1). There is however 
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a clear difference between these two groups and those in the 
freehold category. The latter have definitely higher average monthly 
income, on account of less unemployment, higher education levels 
and better quality jobs. Note however the relatively high standard 
deviations of income in the informal and group categories. This 
underscores the point that in these settlements one finds a wide 
diversity of income generating activities. Thus one regularly finds 
relatively high earning individuals who have, for a variety of reasons, 
taken up residence in these settlements.
In terms of the conceptual framework developed by Mooya and 
Cloete (Mooya & Cloete, 2007: 154), an increase in the size of 
real estate markets in both trading frequency (churn) and spatial 
extent is considered desirable because of economies of scale and 
scope that this can bring about (Furubotn & Richter, 1998), thereby 
increasing opportunities for capital gains. 
A sense of the state of market activity in the 2 years immediately 
prior to the study was built by combining responses from a number of 
questions, namely, period since acquisition of property, knowledge 
of local sales and knowledge of rental activities. The study has shown 
that there is very little secondary market activity for all three rights 
categories in the study area (see Mooya & Cloete, 2010: 436-445). 
Table 5: Knowledge of local sale activity
Knowledge of local sale activity

















































Source: Authors’ survey data
The data shows that over 90% of respondents in the informal 
category have no knowledge of any sale transaction (see Table 5). 
The respective figures for group and informal categories are 97.5% 
and 77.8%. The finding of limited transaction activity is consistent 
with results obtained elsewhere (see for instance Gilbert, 2002: 1-19; 
Home & Lim, 2004; Ward, de Souza & Giusti, 2004: 2621-2646). It 
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would appear therefore that opportunities to derive benefits from 
trade and expanded markets are limited in the case of Windhoek’s 
settlements. The obvious question is why this is the case. 
High transaction costs cannot be the sole or main explanation, as 
there is no evidence of high propensities to trade being frustrated by 
such costs. In their study, Home & Lim (2004) conjecture that the lack 
of market activity could be attributed to householders’ reluctance 
to view their houses as marketable commodities. 
Our own study suggests that there is merit in this argument, with 
hardly any respondents contemplating selling (see Mooya & Cloete, 
2010: 436-445), and even then only as a consequence of major life 
decisions, such as emigration from the area.
Whatever the reasons are for the state of affairs, it is clear that real 
estate markets in Windhoek’s low-income settlements at present 
cannot be leveraged for capital accumulation in any significant 
manner, and that this will remain so unless interventions are made to 
‘prime’ these markets (Mooya, 2011: 238-244). 
This means deliberate interventions aimed at bringing about increased 
trading activity. This raises the often overlooked point that markets do 
not just come about, a point which the conceptualisation of markets 
as ‘spontaneous order’ tends to obscure. This conceptualisation 
rests in part on the ubiquity of markets in society and the apparent 
ease with which they appear to function. On the contrary, formal 
markets depend not only on an elaborate legal and administrative 
infrastructure, but also on cultural repertoires favourably disposed to, 
or facilitative of impersonal exchange systems. 
While the lack of market activity affects all property rights categories 
the chi-square test shows that there are statistically significant 
differences between the rights categories. The hypothesis that 
knowledge of local sale activity is the same is rejected with a p 
value of 0.0000. The data shows that there is more sale activity in the 
freehold category (Table 5 shows that almost 20% respondents know 
of at least one sale). 
There is a sense of a nascent market struggling to emerge in the 
freehold category, one that is closest in character to conventional 
middle class real estate markets. It appears that more activity 
levels could have been observed were it not for some distortions. 
Compared to middle class housing, NHE housing is heavily subsidised. 
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Housing is developed with state funding obtained on less than 
commercial terms, and on land obtained from the municipality at 
cost. Because the NHE has access to low cost finance, it lends up to 
4% below market rates. Due to the huge demand for housing, even 
from the middle classes, it was felt appropriate to restrict eligibility to 
the poor. Thus eligibility for these houses has been officially restricted 
to those earning up to N$4,000 per month (1US$ = approx. N$7) 
though there is some flexibility in this. 
Further, in an attempt to prevent ‘down-raiding’ by the middle 
class the NHE has had a policy of discouraging sales of these 
houses, effected in part by restricting formal transfer of ownership 
to individuals. This has had a dampening effect on market activity. 
This is an example of an instance where strong rights, because 
they are not easily transferable, have had a negative impact on 
market activity.
There is another sense in which the subsidised nature of the NHE 
houses has had a negative effect on market activity. The relatively 
low (i.e. affordable) prices combined with limited availability of stock, 
largely on account of insufficient developable land for low-income 
housing, have created conditions whereby demand outstrips supply 
by far. The NHE is able to provide their most basic two-room 24 m2 
core house at N$65, 000. 
A conventional 2 bedroom 63 m2 house is priced at between N$163, 
000 and N$175, 000. In comparison, the minimum normal price for 
a 2 bedroom house with full finishes in Windhoek is over N$250, 000 
(Tekie, 2008: personal communication). 
This makes the NHE houses a very attractive proposition and 
explains on one hand the long waiting list and need to allocate 
units administratively, and the reluctance of householders to trade 
their properties on the other. In these circumstances, there is no 
guarantee that a seller can easily find another house in a similar or 
slightly higher price range. 
Distortions caused both by restrictions on sale and insufficient stock 
therefore prevents the emergence of normal market activity in the 
freehold category, despite apparent pressures for movement in 
that direction. ‘Normal’ here refers to open transactions between 
private individuals unhindered by bureaucracy.
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Table 6: Knowledge of local rental activity
Knowledge of local rental activity



























































































Source: Authors’ survey data
If sale markets are weak, the picture regarding rental markets 
is better. Table 6 shows awareness about outright rent of entire 
properties as opposed to letting parts of dwellings. Overall, the data 
suggests more awareness about rental compared to sale activity. In 
comparing between categories, the situation is effectively reversed, 
with respondents in the group category more likely to be aware of 
rental activity. Thus 17.5% of this group know over 5 cases of outright 
rental of dwellings, compared to 8.4% and 5.6% for respondents in 
the informal and freehold categories respectively. Alternatively only 
35% of the group category is not aware of any rental transaction, 
compared to 81.9% and 80.6% for the other categories respectively. 
As pointed out before, there appears to be a very limited market for 
outright rentals of entire dwellings. Only 17 out of the 440 respondents 
(i.e. approximately 4%) were found to be renting in this fashion. 
However, the picture becomes vastly different if one considers the 
incidence of rentals of rooms in dwellings or backyard dwellings. 
Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that this is very widespread. A 
conservative estimate based on direct observation suggests that at 
least 60% of dwellings have a ‘back yard’ structure linked to them. 
This is a consistent pattern across the three rights categories. These 
structures are especially visible in the freehold category as they are 
invariably made out of sheet metal, which contrasts with the brick 
material of the main dwelling.
It is quite clear that in many cases, these backyard structures are 
occupied by tenants paying rent. Getting an accurate picture 
Acta Structilia 2012: 19(2)
64
proved difficult firstly due to methodological problems and secondly 
due to widespread reticence by respondents. The former was on 
account of the fact that the sampling was at household level, 
resulting in failure to capture room or backyard tenants. The latter 
was due to widespread reluctance by respondents to admit to 
renting out rooms or backyard structures. The stock answer in many 
cases was that these were occupied by family or friends at no cost.





Maximum Minimum Range Median Number 
of obser-
vations
Informal 250.00 0.00 250.00 250.00 0 250.00 2
Group 100.50 112.89 250.00 0.00 250.00 76.00 8
Freehold 1100.00 312.25 1500.00 800.00 700.00 1000.00 9
Source: Authors’ survey data
Bearing in mind the small sample size for rental of entire dwellings, 
Table 7 shows the average rents paid. The data suggests that there 
may not be significant differences between rentals paid in the 
informal and group areas. Rentals paid in the formal areas on the 
other hand are significantly higher. But perhaps what is of more 
importance is that the rentals, while little in absolute terms, represent 
a significant proportion of average household income Thus average 
rents paid in the informal area amount to approximately 26% of 
reported average household income. 
Table 8 shows that approximately 72% of respondents in the freehold 
category obtained their houses from the NHE. The data confirms on 
one hand the lack of secondary market activity across the rights 
categories (evidenced by the lack of transactions between ‘private 
persons’) and the relatively better performance of the freehold 
sector in this regard. The preponderance of the NHE in the low-
income freehold market is a result of failure in both financial and 
development markets. The relatively low income of households, 
poor credit ratings and limited secondary market activity means 
this category is perceived as too risky for commercial banks and 
private commercial developers. The NHE acts both as developer 
and financier, and has a virtual monopoly in this regard. Because 
it has access to finance and land at concessionary rates, and is 
prepared to accept higher risks than commercial operators, it is 
able to provide affordable housing to the poor. What is significant 
is that NHE housing effectively provides the only means for the poor 
to reach the lowest rungs of the formal real estate ladder. It is an 
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important bridge between the fully commercialised middle class 
markets on one hand and the low-income informal ones on the 
other. For those in the informal and group categories, it represents 
something to aspire for. But, and as we have noted above, this 
market is negatively affected by insufficient stock, restrictive eligibility 
criteria and some restrictions on sale activity. 
Table 8: Source of property acquisition
Source of property acquisition





















































































Source: Authors’ survey data
Given that the demand for NHE housing by far outstrips supply, a 
hierarchical or administrative rather than market based system of 
allocation becomes necessary to ensure that target groups acquire 
these homes. Such a system simplifies the market process for the 
poor in terms of the activities of search, inspection, contracting, 
execution, control and enforcement. The NHE provides a single-
stop service, not only by providing finance but facilitating the 
registration of deeds and all related activities. NHE therefore acts 
as developer, lender, estate agent, conveyancer and property 
manager, a combination that makes freehold property affordable 
to the poor. It is evident that without this type of arrangement, the 
majority of residents in the freehold category would be occupying 
informal property. Administrative allocation of scarce and valuable 
resources like real estate however invariably spawns corruption and 
other forms of ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour. These may impose costs, 
whose magnitude cannot easily be quantified, on the poor.
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Table 9: Method of property acquisition
Method of property acquisition
















































































Source: Authors’ survey data
An attempt was made to measure the types of transactions and the 
spatial extent of markets, with the intention of gauging the ability 
of the various property rights systems to support activity beyond 
immediate neighbourhoods. Theory holds that expanded markets 
result from clear property rights and are positively associated 
with capital accumulation. Table 9 shows the methods by which 
property is acquired under the different property rights systems. 
The hypotheses that the methods of property acquisition in the 
lower and higher income groups are the same for all the rights 
categories are rejected, with chi-square tests yielding p values of 
0.000. There are thus statistically significant differences in the way 
property is acquired between the informal and group categories 
on one hand, and the freehold category on the other, even 
when income differences are controlled for. Most of the former 
acquire vacant plots and build their own homes (60.2% and 92.4% 
respectively) whereas the vast majority (84.8%) of the latter acquire 
fully developed housing. Vacant plots in informal areas were in the 
main acquired without monetary consideration, but payments of 
up to N$3,500 have been reported. The median price for informal 
plots is zero and the mean is N$160. Payment for plots in group areas 
range from zero up to N$12,000 with a mean price of approximately 
N$4,500 and a median of N$5,400. The vast majority of those with 
freeholds on the other hand are most likely to have purchased a 
fully developed house. The mean purchase price in this category 
is approximately N$50,600, with a median of N$47,000. A few 
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respondents in this category however bought plots at an average 
price of N$17,750 and subsequently built their own homes at an 
average cost of N$38,500.
Table 10: Prior residence
Prior residence









































































Source: Authors’ survey data
Table 10 measures the spatial extent of transaction activity, based 
on the respondents’ place of residence immediately prior to their 
current acquisitions. Overall across the three categories there is 
both very little intra-settlement movement and very few recent 
arrivals. The data, therefore, suggest that acquisitions take place 
over relatively long distances. The acquisition of property over long 
distances in a context of unclear or illegal property rights, on the 
one hand, and a complex urban landscape, on the other, does a 
priori pose considerable challenges to those involved. The process 
entails a number of distinct activities which may usefully be viewed 
as beginning with the search for potential properties and ending with 
physical occupation. In between a range of activities must take place, 
such as finding a suitable property and rightful person with whom to 
transact, the evaluation of bona	fides, comparing prices, and so on. 
These activities, in turn, generate transaction costs which, as was 
noted earlier, can be categorised as search and information costs, 
bargaining and decision costs, and supervision and enforcement 
costs (Furubotn & Richter, 1998). Theory predicts that the presence of 
these costs will require institutions to facilitate transactions.
For conventional or formal real-estate markets, this means systems 
of property advertising, legal contracts, system of title registration, 
and so on, all backed by enforcement capabilities of the state via 
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the police and the judicial system. Most of these institutions are, 
by definition, inoperable in informal markets. Informal institutions, 
therefore, must emerge to perform similar functions. Findings from 
both survey data and the in-depth unstructured interviews with 
the six respondents in the informal category show that transaction 
activity in the informal category is to a large extent, facilitated by 
social networks, whereas hierarchical organisations predominate in 
the group and freehold categories. The survey data reveals that, in 
the informal category, property is mostly acquired either ‘informally’ 
(39.3%) or from the municipality (31%) (see Table 9 above). The 
31% in the informal category who report acquiring land from the 
municipality were in fact resettled there by the City from other 
informal settlements, but have never been issued with formal title. 
The figure is almost certainly higher than it should be in practice, 
because of the reluctance by respondents to admit to their informal/
illegal status. A significant proportion (19%) acquired property from 
relatives or friends. Informal modes of acquisition refer to a range 
of practices which include illegal land invasion, settlement by 
‘committees’ (discussion to follow) or by invitation from relatives or 
friends. The study thus finds that the informal areas are characterised 
by small homogeneous pockets, based on common ethnic or kinship 
background. This is a visible manifestation of the results of network 
activity. Social networks facilitate the six transaction activities, 
thus lowering transaction costs for those seeking to access land in 
the city (see Fawaz, 2008 for similar findings in the case of Beirut). 
Networks provide information on land availability, where to settle, 
whom to see, and so on. Solidarity and a shared understanding 
arising from a common ethnic or kinship heritage lowers the need 
for, and therefore the costs of bargaining, decision-making, control 
and enforcement. The relatively low incidence of property-related 
disputes found is testimony to this.
Networks based purely on ethnic or kinship ties, while clearly playing 
an important role in facilitating access to land, are not sufficient 
in themselves to deal with the pressures of high immigration 
and the urban imperative towards more heterogeneity in the 
composition of the population. Managing these pressures requires 
more authoritarian structures, a role played by ‘neighbourhood 
committees’. These committees are ubiquitous in Windhoek’s 
informal settlements. The municipality encourages them, as they 
provide the basis for community engagement and mobilisation. 
Members are supposed to be democratically elected and to 
hold office for specific periods, but there is no evidence that this is 
happening. In fact, the evidence is that most of these committees 
have taken a life of their own and are not fully accountable to either 
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the municipality or the local residents. For example, by allocating 
plots of land to private individuals, these committees are in direct 
contravention of official policy. Behind the chaotic façade of 
informal settlements these committees provide an important service 
to prospective immigrants. Since they are virtually everywhere, they 
provide an entry point to the settlement, especially for those who 
might be ‘strangers’. They allocate land, sometimes for free, but 
frequently in return for payment of what are, to the poor, substantial 
‘fees’. It is safe to assume that these illegal payments end up in the 
private pockets of committee members. It must be stressed that 
settlement via social networks or by ‘committee’ are not mutually 
exclusive. The key issue is the nature of the relationship between 
members of the committee, the neighbourhood concerned and 
the prospective settler. 
These committees occupy a space between the purely informal 
social networks and the formal, hierarchical organisations, such as 
the municipality, the NHE and the NHAG. They are partly network-
based, in that members may have a shared origin, and partly 
hierarchical, in that they are composed of officials supposedly 
elected by local communities and with some de facto authority 
over local land affairs. As noted earlier, these committees provide 
an important role; they not only provide information and access to 
land, but also have control and enforcement functions. They are 
particularly important in this regard for those who might not have 
access to social networks.
The key question for this article, however, is not only the extent 
to which these informal institutions lower transaction costs for 
participants, but also the extent to which they facilitate capital 
accumulation. Of specific interest is their ability to support the types 
of market described in the conceptual framework as necessary for 
capital accumulation. The study shows that, while social networks are 
able to support spatially expansive markets and guarantee access 
to urban land for poor immigrants, this is mainly restricted to ethnic 
or kinship clusters. They are not well placed to support impersonal 
transactions between perfect strangers, thus limiting market depth. 
The neighbourhood committees go some way in mitigating this, 
but they too have certain limitations. As indicated, they appear 
not to be fully accountable either to the local authority or to the 
local residents. Due to pressures arising from immigration and the 
huge demand for land, these committees may be susceptible to 
corruption. The study came across instances of conflict between 
households and committees, arising from the latter’s contested 
allocations of plots. These committees are, therefore, potentially 
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a source of insecurity in property rights and, if not checked, could 
assume a mafia-like character. The NHAG has expressed the view 
that these committees are opposed to formalisation programmes, 
something that may be explained by a fear of loss of power and 
rents arising from the status quo.
Access to land in the group category is facilitated by the SDFN 
and its service NGO, the NHAG. These hierarchical organisations 
lower transaction costs for members by identifying suitable land, 
negotiating its acquisition with municipal bureaucrats, and facilitating 
its subdivision and settlement by individual households. They help the 
savings groups to devise constitutions which, in turn, provide a basis 
for the creation and enforcement of group and individual property 
rights. In addition, they respond to the failure by formal finance 
markets to provide funds to the poor for housing development. 
Using nothing more than group membership as collateral, the SDFN 
has been able to provide house loans to many. It is important to 
note that loan recovery rate is relatively high, at approximately 86% 
(Muller, 2008: Personal communication) compared to the 35%-50% 
recorded for NHE loans (Tekie, 2008: Personal communication). From 
the point of view of capital accumulation, the SDFN loans have 
played the key role in transforming the gradual savings of group 
members into higher valued real estate. The main problem appears 
to be related to a lack of clarity regarding the content of property 
rights, particularly of the right to sell.
5. Concluding summary
This article attempted to determine whether specific types of property 
rights were associated with particular ‘governance structures’ and 
whether there were implications for poverty alleviation or capital 
accumulation arising from alternative modes of organising real-
estate transactions. Property rights theory associates enhanced 
transaction activity in real-estate markets with poverty alleviation 
via enhanced opportunities for capital gains and trading-up. 
Property rights theory predicts that regimes of informal property 
rights are least able to support impersonal decentralised exchange 
systems. The findings in this study lend support to this view. The study 
has shown that network governance structures are the predominant 
modes of organising transactions under conditions of informal 
property rights. These networks, based on kinship and ethnicity, 
provide appropriate low-cost mechanisms for transaction activity 
under the specific conditions of informality and illegality obtaining 
in these settlements. These networks enable the very poor to have 
access to real estate and, therefore, a toe-hold in Windhoek, despite 
Mooya et al • Governance structures
71
numerous obstacles, including from officialdom. These accessibility 
advantages are, however, tempered by the insecurities associated 
with informal property rights and the fact that networks appear to 
lock households in clusters based on ethnicity and kinship.
Freehold property rights, being the most secure, are regarded as 
most facilitative of impersonal markets, but they come at a cost. 
Thus, the study shows that hierarchical structures predominate in the 
freehold and group categories. With regard to the former category, 
a combination of poverty, costs associated with freehold rights, high 
demand and limited stock creates conditions where administrative 
allocation becomes the optimal coordination mechanism. To 
put it simply, individual freehold ownership, without some sort of 
subsidy, remains unaffordable to the poor, even if they are in 
formal employment, preventing the emergence of normal markets. 
Limited land and financial resources mean that it is not possible to 
provide freehold property in sufficient quantities to meet demand. 
This necessitates an administrative rather than a market-based 
allocation system which, in turn, causes distortions in market activity, 
as bureaucrats attempt to restrict market activity or engage in rent-
seeking activities.
Overall the study concludes that a lack of secondary market 
activity in all the three rights categories severely limits the potential 
for capital gains from sale markets. This has negative implications 
on the ability of these markets to support trading-up, therefore 
inhibiting the movement of households up the property ladder. 
This movement would, of course, be the means whereby capital 
accumulation would be effected.
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